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Women Lawyers and the Struggle for Change in Conflict and Transition 
Anna Bryson and Kieran McEvoy1 
 
Abstract. This article examines the particular experiences of female ‘cause lawyers’ in conflicted and 
transitional societies. Drawn from an ongoing comparative project which involved fieldwork in 
Cambodia, Chile, Israel, Palestine, Tunisia and South Africa, the paper looks at opportunities, obstacles 
and the obduracy required from such lawyers to ‘make a difference’ in these challenging contexts. 
Drawing upon the theoretical literature on the sociology of the legal profession, cause-lawyers, gender 
and transitional justice, and the structure/agency nexus, the article considers in turn the conflict\cause-
lawyering intersection and the work of cause-lawyers in transitional contexts. It concludes by arguing 
that the case-study of cause-lawyers offers a rebuttal to the charge that transitional justice is just like 
‘ordinary justice’. It also contends that, notwithstanding the durability of patriarchal power in 
transitional contexts, law remains a site of struggle, not acquiescence, and many of these cause-lawyers 
have and continue to exercise both agency and responsibility in ‘taking on’ that power.  
 
1.0  Introduction 
[I]t was tough.  I think it was tough for men and women because, you know, we were 
fighting a system where the prosecutors or the presiding officers, everybody was hostile 
...  It was a hard long fight right through.  But being a woman obviously makes it even 
more difficult, you know.2 
 
There aren’t a lot of women in, you know, in high ranking positions in the Bar 
Association … And of course there’s the organisational culture that comes with that - 
what is important, how you measure success, who is influential and how you become 
                                                          
* Dr Anna Bryson is a Research Fellow at the School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast. Her research 
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authors would like to acknowledge the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) which funded 
this research (Grant Reference ES/J009849/1), the anonymous reviewers and our colleagues on the 
project, Professor Louise Mallinder and Marny Requa. In addition, we would also like to thank those 
who gave useful feedback on previous versions of this paper presented at the Socio-Legal Studies 
Association in Warwick and the Law and Society Conference in Seattle in 2015.  
2 Personal interview with veteran struggle lawyer, Cape Town, South Africa, 12 August 2014.  
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influential … from the very beginning it’s very masculine, it’s a very masculine 
profession.3 
 
The study of transitional justice is already replete with analysis of the legal work and 
effect of various international and domestic courts and tribunals, amnesties, truth 
commissions and rule of law programmes.4  The ‘rule of law’ is widely accepted as 
perhaps the key material and symbolic marker that denotes the break with the past in 
transitional societies.5 While there is a significant literature on judicial appointments, 
independence and decision making in transitional contexts,6 the role of lawyers as 
social, political and moral actors outside the courts, or indeed as the ‘real people at 
work in the system’7 is much less developed. It is true that anthropologically 
influenced work on legal pluralism, post-colonial lawyering and transitional justice 
‘from below’ does explore contests over the ownership of justice and the dominance 
of lawyers.8 Indeed interdisciplinary critiques of excessive legalism are becoming 
increasingly common in the field.9 While some scholars have examined the challenges 
of lawyering in conflicted and transitional societies,10 such studies usually focus on 
                                                          
3 Personal interview with human rights lawyer and activist, Tel Aviv, Israel, 14 May 2014. 
4 Schabas William A and Bernaz Nadia Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law Routledge 
Abingdon 2011; Mallinder Louise Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace and 
Justice Divide Hart Publishing Oxford 2008; Chapman Audrey R and Van der Merwe Hugo (eds) Truth 
and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia 
2009. 
5 Teitel Ruti Transitional Justice Oxford University Press Oxford 2000; Czarnota Adam, Krygier Martin 
and Sadurski Wojciech (eds) Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Central European University 
Press Budapest 2006; Couso Javier, Huneeus Alexandra and Sieder Raches (eds) Cultures of Legality: 
Judicialization and Political Activism in Latin America Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2010. 
6 See for example Morison John, McEvoy Kieran and Anthony Gordon (eds) Judges, Transition and 
Human Rights Oxford University Press Oxford 2007; Hilbrink Lisa Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy 
and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2007. 
7 Friedman Lawrence The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective Russell Sage New York 1975 p 155. 
8 Engle Merry Sally Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice 
University of Chicago Press Chicago 2005; Sharafi Mitra ‘A New History of Colonial Lawyering: 
Lihowski and Legal Identities’ (2007) 32(4) Law and Social Inquiry 1059; McEvoy Kieran ‘Beyond 
Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’ (2007) 34(4) Journal of Law and 
Society 411. 
9 See for example McEvoy Kieran and McGregor Lorna (eds) Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots 
Activism and the Struggle for Social Change Hart Publishing Oxford 2008; Clark Phil The Gacaca Courts, 
Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2010; Palmer 
Nicola Courts in Conflict: Interpreting the Layers of Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda Oxford University Press 
Oxford 2015. 
10 Abel Richard L Politics by Other Means: Law and the Struggle Against Apartheid in South Africa 1980-1994 
Routledge London 1995; Caiger Andrew Cause Lawyering in South Africa: The Process of Empowering a 
Rights Based Legal Culture and its Socio-Political Impact Austin & Winfield Publishers San Francisco 2005; 
Dezalay Yves and Garth Bryant G The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists and the 
Contest to Transform Latin American States University of Chicago Press Chicago 2002; Hajjar Lisa Courting 
Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza University of California Press Santa 
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one case study, and correspondingly few examine the particular role of female 
lawyers in such contexts. 
This article is drawn from a large comparative study of lawyers in six jurisdictions, 
namely Cambodia, Chile, Israel, Palestine, Tunisia and South Africa.11 In 2014 we 
conducted a total of 40 semi-structured interviews with women lawyers and activists 
(from a total of over 120 interviews spread across the jurisdictions). Although our 
questions on gender were addressed to both male and female interviewees the quotes 
cited in this article are exclusively drawn from interviews with women.12 The 
jurisdictions were chosen in order that we might do ‘structured, focused 
comparisons’13 drawing on semi-structured interviews with key actors in order to 
provide a balance that allows for a nuanced grasp of the local and the potential for 
cautious ‘mid-range theorising’.14 The case-studies were specifically chosen to capture 
different dynamics which interested us: (a) countries with a history of violence and/or 
oppression at different stages of transition; (b) jurisdictions from the principal ‘legal 
families’ 15 (i.e. the Common Law tradition, the Civil Law Tradition, Islamic tradition, 
as well as Asian and African legal tradition); and (c) jurisdictions which variously had 
experience of cause or struggle lawyering, international justice, and past focused 
transitional justice. As evidenced by the quotes above, the focus of the interviews was 
both on the material areas of struggle in which the interviewees were engaged and 
also their experiences as women lawyers working in what were often viewed as 
patriarchal legal cultures.  
                                                          
Monica 2005; Collins Cath Post-transitional Justice: Human Rights Trials in Chile and El Salvador 
Pennsylvania State University Press University Park 2010. 
11 As noted above, this major international comparative research project is funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ES/J009849/1). See www.lawyersconflictandtransition.org (last visited 8 
January 2016). 
12 In Cambodia due to ongoing concerns regarding both personal safety and professional life each of 
the three women we interviewed asked to be referred to simply as ‘an international lawyer’. In Chile 
we spoke to a government lawyer, the director of a human rights organisation, a legal academic and 
human rights activist, a lawyer in private practice and a civil society activist. Our cohort in Israel 
included three legal academics and human rights activists, a politician and lawyer, three lawyers 
working in human rights NGOs and two lawyers working in private practice. In Palestine the women 
we interviewed included three female lawyers employed by human rights NGOs, a lawyer in private 
practice and a civil society activist. In Tunisia female interviewees included one of Ben Ali’s former 
lawyers and allies, two Europeans working for Tunisian based NGOs, three ‘cause lawyers’ working 
in private practice, and two lawyers working for human rights NGOs. Finally in South Africa we 
interviewed two celebrated female cause lawyers, a legal academic and activist, and a former ANC 
activist. 
13 Zartman I William ‘Comparative Case Studies’ (2005) 10 International Negotiation 3 at 7.  
14 Merton Robert On Theoretical Sociology Free Press New York 1968. 
15 Glenn H Patrick ‘Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions’ in Reimann Mathias 
and Zimmermann Reinhard (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law Oxford University Press 
Oxford 2006 p 421-440. 
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For the current paper, we seek to explore issues which illuminate the struggles of 
women lawyers in such settings while still acknowledging the very real distinctions 
both between the lawyers themselves and between case-studies at varying stages of 
conflict and transition. As Meintjies et al have argued, ‘women who live through war 
and conflict do not fall into a single group’.16 To seek to present the experiences of 
women lawyers as ‘the same’ in one jurisdiction, never mind six, would fall into the 
well identified trap of essentialising the lives of women in transitional justice while 
getting on with the ‘serious business’ of discussing the lives of men in all of their 
intricacies and complexities.17 As is discussed below, there are important ways in 
which gender intersects with variables such as race, class and religion, and of course 
the local context in which these women lawyers work directly impacts upon their 
professional and personal lives. With regard to the latter, each jurisdiction has its own 
unique historical, cultural, religious and political variables, as well as different legal 
cultures. For example, in Chile, one cannot but acknowledge the very specific 
influence of the Catholic Church in shaping both approaches to dealing with the past 
and related issues concerning the cause of female equality. In South Africa, the 
particular prominence of some women in the struggle (with many straddling the 
ranks of struggle lawyers and the women’s movement) is sometimes evidenced to 
eulogise the advances in women’s civil and political rights in transition – an 
assumption which we question.18 In a somewhat analogous fashion, the experiences 
of women cause-lawyers in Israel and Palestine must be framed within the broader 
reality of the ongoing occupation and associated conflict. Central to our approach to 
comparative research is to ‘make sense of difference’.19 While fore-grounding 
important distinctions between the lawyers we interviewed and the local variables 
across all of the case-studies, we seek to draw out key themes which allow us the 
opportunity to develop what Popper referred to as ‘contingent empirical 
generalisations’,20 i.e. contingent because they apply usually under certain (specified) 
conditions, and empirical because they are derived from close analyses of a range of 
historical cases. 
It might be useful at this stage to offer a brief overview of some of the key concepts 
which inform the discussions in this paper. In particular we draw on some of the most 
                                                          
16 Meintjies Sheila, Pillay Anu and Turshen Meredeth (eds) The Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict 
Transformation Zed Books London 2001 p 16. 
17 Alam Mayesha Women and Transitional Justice Palgrave London 2004 p 3.  
18 Hassim notes, for example, that ‘[t]he transition to democracy in South Africa ushered in a formal 
institutional framework and a government that has been held up as a model of serious commitment to 
the ideal of gender equality.’ Hassim Shireen ‘The Gender Pact and Democratic Consolidation: 
Institutionalizing Gender Equality in the South African State’ (2003) Feminist Studies 29(3) 505 at 505. 
See further Waylen Georgina Engendering Transitions: Women’s Mobilizations, Institutions and Gender 
Outcomes Oxford University Press Oxford 2007 pp 199-202. 
19 Nelken David Comparative Criminal Justice: Making Sense of Difference Sage Publications London 2010. 
20 Popper Karl The Logic of Scientific Discovery Routledge London 1959. 
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relevant literature on cause lawyers, gender and the legal profession, gender in 
transitional justice and the structure agency nexus.   
In all of the societies we have been researching law has been used as a tool of 
repression by the state and, to varying degrees, as one source of resistance by those 
engaged in political and social struggles for change. Inevitably in such contexts, the 
role of lawyers becomes crucial, whether as detached professionals ‘delivering a 
service’ to their clients or as self-conscious political actors who use ‘legal skills to 
pursue ends and ideals that transcend client service’ within and beyond the court as 
part of such broader struggles.21 ‘Cause-lawyering’ is the genre of scholarship most 
associated with analysing such lawyers. Sarat and Scheingold have edited a number 
of important US based and international collections detailing the ways in which cause-
lawyers contest prevailing political, social, moral or legal power.  While there are 
multiple definitions, at its core cause lawyering is a form of ‘moral activism’ which 
transcends the boundaries between the legal and the political, wherein committed 
lawyers ‘do more’ than simply deploy their technical services on behalf of their 
client.22 Such lawyers may engage in both pro bono and paid work, strategic litigation, 
develop networks and relationships, or indeed become part of broader social or 
political movements and view their responsibilities as going well beyond the court 
room or lawyers office to argue and mobilise publicly for the ‘cause.’23 Cause lawyers 
are essentially much more comfortable than conventional lawyers with the view that 
the law and lawyering is quintessentially political.   
Within the broader sociology of the legal profession from which the cause-lawyering 
literature emerges, there is not surprisingly a significant focus on gender. A range of 
scholar-activists have well captured the close interrelationship between feminist law 
reform and the gendered structure of the legal profession.24 For example, Menkel-
Meadow has argued that the ‘story’ of women’s entry to the legal profession is, for 
most nations, an ‘easy one to tell’: university education expanded exponentially in the 
1970s, many of the most significant formal barriers to women entering the profession 
were lifted and, in tandem with wider cultural developments and changing societal 
attitudes towards women’s roles in family and professional life, women did make 
                                                          
21 Sarat Austin and Scheingold Stuart A Something to Believe In: Politics, Professionalism and Cause-
Lawyering Stanford University Press Palo Alto 2004 pp 3-4. 
22 Boukalas Christos ‘Politics as Legal Action / Lawyers as Political Actors: Towards a 
Reconceptualisation of Cause Lawyering’ (2013) 22(3) Social & Legal Studies 395. 
23 Devyani Prabhat ‘After 9/11: Guantánamo And The Mobilization Of Lawyers’ (2011) 54 Studies in 
Law, Politics, and Society 213; Garcia Melanie ‘The Lawyer as Gatekeeper: Ethical Guidelines for 
Representing a Client with a Social Change Agenda’ (2011) 24 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 551.  
24 Prominent scholar-activists include Catharine MacKinnon, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Martha Fineman, 
Mari Matsuda and Frances Webber. See Grant Bowman Cynthia and Schneider Elizabeth M ‘Feminist 
Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession’ (1998) 67(2) Fordham Law Review 249; 




advances in the legal profession.25 However, despite women now constituting over 
half of law school entrants in many settled democracies, numerous analyses have 
charted that informal barriers to advancement (as reflected in earnings, career 
progression, and status), still persist. Further markers of inequality include the 
concentration of women in silos of ‘gendered legal work’ (e.g. over-representation in 
government, public interest and family law) and significantly higher attrition rates 
amongst female lawyers in many areas of the profession.26 Some of the richest 
discussions on these material realities explore whether patriarchal legal cultures are 
changed by the increased numbers of women or whether women ‘adapt’ to essentially 
male working practices and norms;27 whether women perform law differently to 
men28; whether women define success in the legal profession differently to men29; and 
how gender intersects with race, ethnicity and other variables in the legal profession.30 
                                                          
25 Menkel-Meadow Carrie ‘The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The “Feminization” of the 
Legal Profession’ (1986) 24(4) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 897 at 897. Not surprisingly many of these key 
developments reflected (and informed) evolving feminist legal theories. For an analysis of the 
competing sway of difference and dominance theories see, for example, MacKinnon Catharine 
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law Harvard University Press Cambridge 1987 pp 32-45. 
26 See, for example, Larson Magali S The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis University of 
California Press Berkeley 1977; Curran Barbara A The Lawyer Statistical Report: A Statistical Profile of the 
US Legal Profession in the 1980s American Bar Foundation Chicago 1985; Hagan John ‘The Gender 
Stratification of Income Inequality Among Lawyers’ (1990) Social Forces 68(3) 835; Bolton Sharon C and 
Muzio Daniel ‘Can’t Live With ‘Em; Can’t Live Without ‘Em: Gendered Segmentation in the Legal 
Profession (2007) 41(1) Sociology 47;  Payne-Pikus Monique, Hagan John and Nelson Robert L 
‘Experiencing Discrimination: Race and Retention in America’s Largest Law Firms’ (2010) 44(3) Law 
and Society 553. For the relevant Australian data see ‘Beyond the Statistical Gap: 2009 Court Appearance 
Strategy for Advancing Appearances by Female Advocates in Australian Courts’ Law Council of 
Australia 2009 pp 10-11 and 15-16; ‘National Attrition and Re-engagement Study (NARS) Report’ Law 
Council of Australia 2012 p 9. 
27 Menkel-Meadow Carrie above note 25 at 897. Schultz and Shaw’s authoritative overview of women 
in the legal profession addresses this fundamental question in the context of fifteen civil and common 
law jurisdictions. Schultz Ulrike and Shaw Gisela (eds) Women in the World’s Legal Professions Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2003.   
28 Butler’s Gender Trouble attacks what she considers to be an underlying assumption of feminist theory, 
namely that there is a gendered identity that requires representation in discourse and politics. It 
advances from the notion that gender is essentially ‘performative’ and that the associated ‘acts’ 
constitute – rather than express – the illusion of a stable gender identity. Butler Judith Gender Trouble: 
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity Routledge London 1990.  
29 See for example Menkel-Meadow Carrie ‘Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s 
Lawyering Process’ (1985) 1 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 39; Menkel-Meadow Carrie ‘Exploring a 
Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change’ 
(1989) 14(2) Law and Social Inquiry 289; Menkel-Meadow Carrie ‘Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, 
Feminism and Legal Ethics’ in Parker Stephen and Sampford Charles (eds) Legal Ethics and Legal 
Practice: Contemporary Issues Clarendon Press Oxford 1995 p 25.  
30 Tomlinson Jennifer, Muzio Daniel, Sommerlad Hilary, Webley Lisa and Duff Liz ‘Structure, Agency 
and Career Strategies of White Women and Black and Minority Ethnic Individuals in the Legal 
Profession’ (2013) 66(2) Human Relations 245 at 246; Hanlon Gerard ‘Institutional Forms and 
Organizational Structures: Homology, Trust and Reputational Capital in Professional Service Firms’ 
(2004) 11(2) Organization 186; Sommerlad Hilary ‘The “Social Magic” of Merit: Diversity, Equity, and 
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Notwithstanding the ‘exceptional’ circumstances of the conflicted and transitional 
societies in which we conducted our research (discussed below), many of these 
debates were very familiar to the women lawyers we interviewed.  
Our views in this paper are also of course influenced by the rich literature on gender 
and transitional justice. That literature is discussed in detail elsewhere in this issue, 
but for our purposes a number of themes are particularly relevant. Firstly, we note the 
tendency in transitional justice to frame the experiences of women in binary terms as 
either passive victims (e.g. in court proceedings, before truth commissions, applying 
for reparations) or as agents (e.g. as politicians, NGO activists, negotiators, judges and, 
lawyers).31 Secondly, efforts to ensure that gender based harms form part of the legal 
architecture of transitional justice and that women are involved in all stages of a peace 
process have been key features of transitional justice praxis and scholarship since at 
least the 1990s.32 But in spite of this formal and institutional attention to gendered 
harms and the participatory rights of women, it is clear that the inclusion of women 
(whether as victims or agents) has offered no guarantee of substantive and material 
gains.33 Moreover there are familiar challenges which relate directly to the work of 
                                                          
Inclusion in the English and Welsh Legal Profession’ (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 2330; Pearce Russell 
G, Wald Eli and Ballakrishnen Swethaa ‘Difference Blindness Vs. Bias Awareness: Why Law Firms 
With the Best of Intentions Have Failed to Create Diverse Partnerships’ (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 
2407.  
31 Waylen above note 18; Ní Aoláin Fionnuala ‘Advancing Feminist Positioning in the Field of 
Transitional Justice’ (2012) 6(2) International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 at 5. For a fascinating account 
of the struggle to ensure that women were included in the constitutional negotiations to create a 
Democratic South Africa see Albertyn Catherine ‘Women and the Transition to Democracy in South 
Africa’ in Kaganas Felicity and Murray Christina (eds) Gender and the New South African Legal Order 
Cape Town Juta 1994 pp 54-60.  
32 See for example Mayesha above note 17; Bedont Barbara and Hail-Martinez Katherine ‘Ending 
Impunity for Gender Crimes Under the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 6 Journal of World Affairs 
65; Campbell Kirsten ‘The Gender of Transitional Justice: Law, Sexual Violence and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2007) 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice 411. UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) emphasised the need for increased participation of women at 
all stages of peace processes. In October 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 2242 to improve implementation of that agenda. Speaking at the launch of the report 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Executive Director of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women, stated that ‘a growing body of evidence had shown that perhaps the greatest 
but most under-used tool for building peace was the meaningful inclusion of women’. Full text 
available at: www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12076.doc.htm, last accessed 19 January 2016.  
33 For an analysis of the extent to which the gender perspective of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 
was reflected in peace agreements signed between January 1990 and January 2010 see Bell Christine 
and O’Rourke Catherine ‘Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 
on Peace Processes and their Agreements’ (2010) 59(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 941. 
For a criticism of the resolution as an apt example of ‘gender mainstreaming’ see Ní Aoláin Fionnuala, 
Haynes Francesca and Cahn Naomi On the Frontlines: Gender, War, and the Post-Conflict Process Oxford 
Oxford University Press 2011 pp 11 and 16-18. See also Mertus Julie ‘Shouting from the Bottom of a 
Well: the Impact of International Trials for Wartime Rape on Women’s Agency’ (2004) 6 International 
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women cause-lawyers. For some commentators, the inherent limitations of legalism 
for women in particular,34 may arguably channel precious resources and energies into 
legal strategies, thus distracting from other potentially more successful tactics, 
camouflaging root problems and issues, and providing a veneer of legitimacy for 
fundamentally flawed institutions and procedures.35 In addition, in many transitional 
contexts there are almost always complex intersections between gender and the larger 
big ‘P’ political struggles. We note in particular that ‘opportunities for progress’ may 
in hindsight be viewed as moments of retrenchment, as patriarchal cultures and 
practices often prove highly resistant to transitional energies once political change is 
embedded.36 Again all of these themes were reflected in the experiences of the women 
lawyers we interviewed.  
Finally, the paper is informed by some of the most relevant academic discussions on 
the intersection between structure and agency amongst the cause-lawyers we 
interviewed. That literature is notoriously complex.37 At base, the study of the 
structure agency nexus concerns the extent to which human behaviour or actions 
(agency) is shaped by forces which are beyond their control. As Marx famously 
                                                          
Feminist Journal of Politics 110 and O’Rourke Catherine Gender Politics in Transitional Justice Routledge 
London 2013 pp 63-82. 
34 The result for women may be, as suggested by Harris Rimmer, new curtains, cut from the same cloth. 
Harris Rimmer Susan ‘Sexing the Subject of Transitional Justice’ Australian Feminist Law Journal (2014) 
32(1) p 136 at 123. See further Chinkin Christine, Charlesworth Hilary and Wright Shelley ‘Feminist 
Approaches to International Law: Reflections from Another Century’ in Buss Doris and Maji Ambreena 
(eds) International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches Hart Publishing Oxford and Portland Oregon 2005 
p 17-47. 
35 Bell and O’Rourke suggested in a seminal essay in 2007 that transitional justice mechanisms should 
be assessed strategically, in terms of the likely substantive and material gains for women. Bell Christine 
and O’Rourke Catherine ‘Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory Essay’ 
(2007) 1 International Journal of Transitional Justice 23. Similarly Ní Aoláin notes that ‘an uncritical and 
narrowly liberal conception of gender equality directs our gaze away from the cultural, material and 
geopolitical sites in which transitional justice practices have emerged.’ Ní Aoláin above note 31 at 2. 
See further Yarwood Lisa (ed) Women and Transitional Justice: The Experience of Women as Participants 
London Routledge (2013).  
36 Ní Aoláin and Hamilton suggest, for example, that ‘the moment’ of transition can, from a feminist 
perspective, be one of ‘retrenchment’. Such retrenchment, they suggest, is arguably located in the core 
private/public division that accompanies the rule of law in theory and practice. Ní Aoláin Fionnuala 
and Hamilton Michael ‘Gender and the Rule of Law in Transitional Societies’ (March 11, 2009) 
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-12 p 102. Citing the specific example of the work of 
truth commissions, Ní Aoláin and Turner further suggest that the construction of narratives of former 
conflict often translates into a ‘retrenchment of patriarchal family norms and the reassignment of highly 
circumscribed gender roles for women’. Ní Aoláin Fionnuala and Turner Catherine ‘Gender, Truth and 
Transition’ (2007) 16 UCLA Women’s Law Journal 229 at 273. 
37 For an overview see Bourdieu Pierre Outline of a Theory of Practice Nice Richard trans Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 1997; Giddens Anthony The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration Polity Press Oxford 1984; Elder-Vas David The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, 
Structure and Agency Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2010; Archer Margaret Structure, Agency 
and the Internal Conversation Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2003.  
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observed, ‘men [sic] make their own history but they do not make it just as they please, they 
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past.’38 The structural context, or what 
Durkheim has termed ‘social facts’ of the social, political, cultural, legal and of course 
gendered realties of sites such as Pinochet’s Chile, Apartheid South Africa, 
contemporary Palestine or the other contexts discussed herein inevitably influenced 
the work of the cause-lawyers we discuss.39 However, as we discuss further in the 
conclusion, the energetic and inventive approach to activism which many of these 
lawyers brought and bring to their work, provides a useful corrective to an overly 
deterministic and at worse disempowering reading of the power of structural 
variables to control human action. Structures are not ‘immutable constraints’.40 
Notwithstanding the durability of some such structural constraints, the agency 
exercised by women cause-lawyers in even the most difficult of circumstances 
underlines the fact that in Sarat and Scheingold’s terms, they are there to be ‘taken 
on’.41 
 
2.0  Cause Lawyers and ‘the Struggle’  
Q.   Do you see yourself as a political lawyer? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Let's define that, tell me what is a political or a cause-lawyer? 
A: A political lawyer I would say is a person who does not act for the money but he sees 
his work as part of the struggle, as the aiding part, as the backbone of the struggle and 
uses the limited possibilities available through the law to improve the general good.42 
 
It is something of a truism that political conflict and struggles against authoritarian 
regimes may offer somewhat paradoxical opportunities for women’s empowerment.43  
On the one hand the gendered realities of sexual abuse, poverty and what True has 
called the ‘political economy’ of violence against women, which is so often 
                                                          
38 Marx Karl ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ in Feuer Lewis (ed) Marx and Engels: Basic 
Writings on Politics and Philosophy Doubleday New York 1959 p 320.  
39 Durkeim Emile The Rules of Sociological Method Free Press republished Free Press New York 2014, 
especially chapters one and two.   
40 Ewick Patricia and Silbey Susan The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life University of 
Chicago Press Chicago 1998 p 41.   
41 Sarat Austin and Scheingold Stuart ‘The Dynamics of Cause Lawyering’ in Sarat Austin and 
Scheingold Stuart (eds) The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure and Agency in Legal Practice Stanford 
University Press California 2005 p 7.   
42 Personal interview with human rights lawyer, Ramallah, Palestine, 20 May 2014. As in other contexts, 
female interviewees sometimes employed the male pronoun to refer to women and men. 
43 Meintjies Sheila, Pillay Anu and Turshen Meredeth ‘There is No Aftermath for Women’ in Meintjies, 
Pillay and Turshen Meredeth (eds) above note 16 at 7. 
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synonymous with conflict, has been well documented.44  On the other hand, the 
involvement of men in conflict, whether in the context of involvement in armed 
organisations, imprisonment, or even being killed or injured, may offer the chance for 
women to become what Meintjies et al have referred to as ‘agents of change.’45 Such 
agency is not restricted to the familial sphere and may be reflected in community, 
political or professional life.46 Recalling her experience of the first intifada, one 
Palestinian lawyer in the West Bank told us:  
The mum became a huge kind of ‘responsibility-taker’ in a way that wasn't [the case] in 
the past. In addition women were entering the political sphere and not just the political 
sphere, but the activist sphere … many of the men actually were imprisoned and what 
does that mean for the woman that has to stay home and become the breadwinner and 
take care of the family and do all the traditional [male] roles? … I think all of that kind 
of spurred more of an understanding of what their rights could be or should be.47 
In the legal profession, the sheer volume of arrests, trials and human rights violations 
associated with periods of protracted violence and conflict not surprisingly creates 
opportunities for lawyers – both male and female – who are willing to take on such 
‘political’ cases.  As noted above, across the six jurisdictions we interviewed a total of 
40 women human rights activists and lawyers. In some instances, these women have 
become what Hansford has described as ‘legendary’ lawyers.48 Certainly figures such 
as Leah Tsemel, Gaby Lasky, Carmen Hertz, Radhia Nassaoui, Yasmin Sooka, Priscilla 
Jana and others interviewed for this project have all received national or international 
accolades as well as criticism and harassment for their work as ‘cause’ lawyers. For 
some of these women, their work on gender related issues intersected with cause-
lawyering on other broader political struggles.  
I was involved in women’s organisations from the very beginning and thought that was 
the direction I was going … when I came back after having that time outside of Israel and 
                                                          
44 Giles Wenona and Hyndman Jennifer (eds) Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones University of 
California Press Berkeley 2004; Buvinic Mayra, Das Gupta Monica, Casabonne Ursula and Verwimp 
Philip ‘Violent Conflict and Gender Inequality: An Overview’ (2013) 28(1) World Bank Research Observer 
110; True Jacqui The Political Economy of Violence Against Women Oxford University Press Oxford 2012.  
45 Meintjies, Pillay and Turshen (eds) above note 16 at 16. Of course some women also become directly 
involved in armed struggle themselves. See, for example, Ibanez Ana Cristina ‘El Salavador: War and 
Untold Stories, Women Guerrillas’ in Mosner Caroline O N and Clark Fiona C (eds) Victims, Perpetrators 
or Actors: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence Zed Book London 2001 p 117; Yarwood above note 
35.   
46 Bell and O’Rourke above note 33 at 41. See further Ní Aoláin Fionnuala, Hayes Francesca and Cahn 
Naomi On the Frontlines: Gender, War and the Post-Conflict Process Oxford University Press Oxford 2011 
p 6; O’Rourke above note 33 pp 4-5.   
47 Personal Interview with international human rights lawyer, Ramallah, Palestine, 22 May 2014. 
48 Hansford Justin ‘The Legal Ethics of Nelson Mandela’ forthcoming New York Law Review, available 
at: www.ssrn.com abstract no 2556320. 
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getting some new perspective, I realised that what I think is really the most urgent and 
most important thing to deal with is Palestinian rights.49  
 
I was involved first as an activist in student politics, protesting against the regime … 
when I became a lawyer I was involved in defending students and human rights activists 
… I was also a member of a feminist association and we worked on what we saw as 
political issues as well, including delicate and sensitive cases such as rape or sexual 
harassment or any kind of assault that is directed against a girl or a woman. I worked on 
a case about an old lady seventy years old, [name] who was harassed on all levels 
economically, sexually, socially all levels and it took two years campaign of two years in 
order to get her justice. Many other cases such as representing a 12 year child who was 
the victim of rape or sexual harassment where the judge and prosecutor wish to dismiss 
the case because of her age … such cases are ‘feminist’ on the surface but of course behind 
such cases there are many political waves.50 
 
Other women cause-lawyers viewed themselves primarily as political activists 
engaged in the broader political struggle and their work was seen as an expression of 
their commitment to the political struggle as a whole. In effect for some such lawyers, 
there appears little difference between law and politics, as they set about ‘fabricating 
political action with legal tools and legal action that responds to political necessity’.51 
Indeed for some, the status of lawyer was one that allowed an expression of their 
activism, a space to work on what Sarat and Scheingold term ‘a transformative 
agenda’ that is often not available in other walks of life in repressive regimes.52  
I myself was an activist, a political activist before becoming a lawyer you know. I was 
always of course a supporter of the ANC … in my student days I became a very active 
person in the Black Consciousness movement ... And then I qualified as a lawyer … I 
was also an activist; then I had become a very active member, underground member of 
the ANC and part of an ANC cell. But that's beside the point.  The point is that to become 
a human rights lawyer in any conflict situation I think you cannot separate your moral 
duties and your political duties from your legal duties.  I think it's all one.53   
I’ve been a lawyer since 1985 so as with many students I was a university activist and 
then when I started being a lawyer I started defending political detainees, political 
                                                          
49 Personal interview with international human rights lawyer, Tel Aviv, Israel, 14 May 2014. 
50 Personal interview with cause lawyer, Tunis, Tunisia, 16 June 2014. 
51 See Sarat and Scheingold above note 41 at 9; Boukalas Christos ‘Politics as Legal Action\Lawyers as 
Political Actors: Towards a Reconceptualisation of Cause Lawyering (2013) 22(3) Social and Legal 
Studies 395; Michalowski Raymond ‘All or Nothing: an Inquiry into the (Im)Possibility of Cause 
Lawyering Under Cuban Socialism’ in Sarat Austin and Scheingold Stuart A Cause Lawyering: Political 
Commitments and Professional Responsibilities Oxford University Press Oxford 1998. 
52 Sarat and Scheingold above note 21 at 20. 




prisoners arrested for freedom of expression issues and so on … I like the profession. 
Being a lawyer has been the only perhaps the only area of national life that Ben Ali could 
not co-opt.54 
 
I went into exile after the coup because my husband was killed so I left the country with 
my son and I was away for three years.  And when I came back I went immediately and 
started to work at the Vicaría de la Solidaridad - as a full time lawyer there at the Vicaría.  
And that was at the beginning of ‘77.  I went there because of my political convictions. I 
went there to defend the people who were being persecuted and to denounce the crimes 
that were happening. It was the first real space of resistance that opened in Chile. And 
that was the role that we played. We were a generation that they tried to eliminate, that 
they tried to persecute, we were that 60’s generation.  That’s the reason I became a human 
rights lawyer.55 
 
Needless to say that for many such lawyers there were (and in some cases still are) 
significant personal consequences for engagement in such work. In extremis, in 
Cambodia the systematic murder of lawyers, judges and professors was part of the 
genocidal strategy of the Khmer Rouge to eradicate the educated, the bourgeoisie and 
all others deemed a threat to the regime. 56  In Chile, while some lawyers who were 
deemed to be affiliated to leftist or communist organisations were murdered, 
disappeared or expelled, lawyers did enjoy some degree of protection because of their 
profession, international or local affiliations. Even so, the violence and intimidation 
was often directed at others associated with cause lawyers. 57   
The protection of the Church gave us some kind of immunity, some level for various 
reasons … the Cardinal had a permanent interlocutor with the military he could talk to 
                                                          
54 Personal interview with cause lawyer and prisoner rights’ activist, Tunis, Tunisia, 20 June 2014. Zine 
al-Abidine Ben Ali was the authoritarian President of Tunisia for 23 years. In January 2011 he was 
forced to resign and flee to Saudi Arabia; he was subsequently sentenced in absentia for embezzlement 
and corruption. 
55 Personal interview with international human rights lawyer, Santiago, Chile, 28 April 2014. The 
Vicariate of Solidarity was an agency of the Chilean Catholic Church under the Archdiocese of Santiago 
which became one of Chile’s most high profile NGOs litigating on behalf of political prisoners and 
others abducted and tortured by the Pinochet regime. Its effectiveness and ability to operate was widely 
attributed to the protection of the Church.  
56 It is estimated that the Khmer Rouge regime murdered all but 6-12 of the country’s 400-600 lawyers. 
See Donovan Dolores A ‘Cambodia: Building a Legal System from Scratch’ (1993) 27(2) The International 
Lawyer 445. One of our Cambodian interviewees stated: ‘In Cambodia they killed not just lawyers, they 
killed everybody - they killed a whole generation. Today you'll hardly find people of my generation 
aged between 50 and 60 … those that are the foundation of a country, those that are educated - teachers, 
lawyers, doctors, psychiatrists, engineers, they all were gone … lawyers, particularly lawyers, you 
know, I think only a few survived’. Personal interview with NGO lawyer, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 10 
March 2014. 
57 See Snyder Edward C ‘Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Chile 1973-1995’ (1994) 
2 Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 253.  
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them.  Almost all of our activities were public they weren’t clandestine. We were the 
main interlocutor with the UN we would go to Geneva but there were exceptions ... In 
my case they killed the little woman who worked in my house who helped me with 
cleaning my house so she’s one of the people officially recognised as victim of human 
rights violations. They killed her to intimidate me.58  
In other contexts, pressure came in the form of threats, harassment (often sexualised) 
and intimidation by the police, military or even opposing lawyers. An Israeli lawyer 
highlighted the particular danger of sexual violence – whether actual or implied – 
when she was identified as a human rights activist.  
One of them was an incident I had where I was verbally attacked for the work I did and 
for being a woman. In Tel Aviv while sitting in a bar. This was a bar we used to come 
after work with the office so he recognised [named cause-lawyer, head of the firm] of 
course and then me by association. The next week while I was there not surrounded by 
colleagues and male colleagues and kind of unprotected he just started saying horrible 
things. And what was worse for me about that experience was that I didn't respond the 
way that I wanted to, I was just so shocked. He said ‘if I see you in a dark alley you should 
be raped.’  And the management in the place did nothing. I ended up leaving. It took me 
a while to realise how much it influenced me because I found myself sitting at home and 
saying oh, I should have said this, I should have did that and this is very typical for kind 
of victims of sexual harassment … So I think this incident kind of left a stamp on me. 
Later on when the threats and the derogatory speech were more general, you know, 
directed at all people doing human rights, being a fifth wheel and traitors etc., stuff that 
even politicians here say, I think it kind of always brought me back to that incident.59  
Another human rights activist in Israel recounted similar instances of being 
threatened with both physical and sexual violence in custody, including being 
shackled in a cell with other female detainees and tortured with a taser gun.60 In the 
case of Tunisia, such direct intimidation was also over-layered with gendered efforts 
to diminish the reputation of the women lawyers. 
It was difficult for us because they would beat us sometimes, but they would beat us less 
than they do the men.  I was actually kicked by one of the policemen wearing those big 
heavy boots and my leg was swollen for a while.  But they would more often say we were 
women with a bad reputation … they would always accuse us of being informants, of 
cooperating with foreigners, as ‘sell-outs’ as it were, as well as being women of bad 
reputation.61  
                                                          
58 Personal interview with international human rights lawyer, Santiago, Chile, 28 April 2014. 
59 From a personal point of view she also noted that dealing with the military courts and witnessing the 
suffering that was inflicted on young people especially, day after day, eventually took a toll. Personal 
interview with legal academic and human rights activist, 14 May 2014. 
60 Personal interview with human rights activist, Ramallah, Palestine, 22 May 2014. 
61 Personal interview with cause lawyer, Tunis, Tunisia, 20 June 2014. 
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Interviewees also talked to us about the personal, familial and relationship toll of 
involvement in cause-lawyering in such contexts.  In some instances, this appeared a 
more extreme version of the ‘total commitment’ and long working hours complaints 
associated with commercial legal firms.62 A well-known Israeli cause lawyer noted: 
‘There used to be a time when I read the newspaper in the morning and I knew that in 
the evening I would represent the person who planted the bomb … It was difficult for 
my family - very much, oh very much.  To be hated, you know, and it was sheer hatred 
but I didn't care so much, for me it was okay’.63 
 Speaking to the South African context, a former ANC activist noted that being a 
‘struggle lawyer’ like other forms of intense political activism during the conflict and 
transition was not compatible with ‘normal’ family life:  
I think being a struggle lawyer is - it's not nine to five, firstly.  It can be at any time and 
normally all the arrests were only ever happening from night onwards - so you couldn't 
have a nine to five.  So there's the time that you have to put in, but there's also the kind 
of danger you were in.64 
As in other contexts, the familial consequences of such work and activism were often 
most acutely felt once the ‘adrenalin’ of conflict began to subside - in the case of South 
Africa after the 1994 elections which saw the ANC came to power and Nelson 
Mandela was elected President. She continued: 
I don't think there was a single, well maybe a handful of activists that still have their 
original partners that they had when they started out.  For the rest, no, divorce rate is 
very high … I think the amount you had to put in, you know, and it wasn't just time.  You 
had to put yourself in and the implications of that on family and that were quite high … 
there was also the gender issue.  So the female activists, you know, we're also not sitting 
in our slippers anymore, you know, we can do things for ourselves.  And we have opinions 
and for those who became activists it meant they fought a bitter battle at home as well 
for their voices to be heard ... and after the elections where things started settling down 
and now we all have to find ways of getting into a normal life.  What is a normal life?  
You know, you've lived on this adrenaline for so long.65 
                                                          
62 For those who accept the ‘double-burden’ as a given, the reform of working practices - in particular 
the demands for long and unsociable working hours and the corresponding celebration of the ‘ideal 
employee’ as one who works full-time, over-time and with no career interruptions - is an absolute 
priority. See Cha Youngjoo ‘Overwork and the Persistence of Gender Segregation in Occupations’ 
(2013) 27(2) Gender and Society 158; Williams Joan C Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and 
What to do About it Oxford University Press New York 2000; Korzec Rebecca ‘Working on the “Mommy-
Track”: Motherhood and Women Lawyers’ (1997) 8 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 117.   
63 Personal interview with human rights lawyer, Ramallah, Palestine, 20 May 2014. 
64 Personal interview with former ANC and human rights activist, Johannesburg, South Africa, 15 
August 2014. 




 In sum, many of the issues raised by the women cause-lawyers we interviewed 
resonated with the experiences of male cause-lawyers elsewhere. The explicit 
politicisation of lawyering and the conception of legal settings as a site of struggle are 
very familiar themes in the cause lawyering and sociology of lawyers literature. In the 
context of women lawyers, their experience of struggle also intersects in complex ways 
with gender – both in terms of the areas in which they work (e.g. whether they are 
focused explicitly on gender equality or other aspects of political and social struggle) 
and in the ways in which they are treated by state officials, legal adversaries and 
others. Moreover, both during periods of conflict and transition (which we discuss in 
more detail below) the price paid for doing such work on personal, professional and 
familial level can be high indeed.   
    
3.0  Cause Lawyers and the Transition 
As discussed above, there is now a significant literature on gender, activism and 
transitional justice. One of the successes for feminists over the last two to three decades 
has been the increased recognition of gender-based harms and violations as a key 
focus of transitional justice.66  There is a sense, as O’Rourke has noted, that ‘the 
doctrine and institutions of international law have never been more supportive of 
delivering positive human rights outcomes for women from domestic processes of 
transitional justice.’67 Specifically numbered among the ‘gains’ in this area are the 
inclusion of crimes of sexual violence as a ‘grave breach’ of the Geneva conventions68; 
the establishment of rape as a crime against humanity in the Rome statute69 and what 
Franke refers to as ‘paradigm-shifting’ indictments and convictions at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – variously recognising sexual violence as 
an element of genocide, torture and inhumane treatment.70  
                                                          
66 See for example Campbell above note 32 at 411.  
67 O’Rourke above note 33 at 7. 
68 Copelon Rhonda ‘Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law’ 
(1994) 5 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 243; Copelon Rhonda ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating 
Crimes Against Women into International Criminal Law’ (2000) 46 McGill Law Journal 217. 
69 Oosterveld Valerie ‘The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?’ (2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 55. 
70 Franke Katherine M ‘Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice’ (2006) 15(3) Columbia Journal of Gender 
and Law 813 at 816-817. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights also accepted in Gladys Carol 
Espinoza Gonzáles v the Republic of Peru Case 11.157, Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
Report No 67/11, 31 March 2011 that rape constituted torture. See further Green Jennifer, Copelon 
Rhonda, Cotter Patrick and Stephens Beth ‘Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and Other 
Gender-Based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A 
Feminist Proposal and Critique’ (1994) 5 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 171; Askin Kelly D ‘A Decade of 
the Development of Gender Crimes in International Courts and Tribunals: 1993 to 2003’ (2004) 11(3) 
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For the non-retributive variants of transitional justice, such as truth recovery or 
reparations, there has also been incremental but important progress. The early Latin 
American truth commissions were rightly berated for failing to recognise gender as a 
key dimension of truth seeking.71 This was at least partially corrected in the 
Guatemalan, South African and Peruvian commissions in which sexual violence was 
addressed under the banner of torture and ill-treatment.72 Concerns have nonetheless 
persisted about the issue of under-reportage of instances of sexual violence73  and the 
aforementioned dangers of confining the frame of reference for gender-based harms 
to a narrow conception of sexual violence.74 Ross meanwhile has produced a probing 
analysis of women’s relationship to testimony and in particular the types of violence 
and suffering about which they choose (or feel pressured) to remain silent.75 From a 
practical point of view others have suggested that well-designed truth commissions 
that yield valuable information about the patterns and themes of gender-based harms 
are of limited value if they do not help to yield substantive and material gains for 
women designed to repair as much as possible the damage done by such harms.76 
With regard to reparations, there has been significant work done to try to broaden the 
gaze of reparations (e.g. to recognise forced ‘marital unions’, domestic labour or 
property loss)77 and indeed to advocate for a transformative version of gender 
reparations which can ‘subvert existing patriarchal structures’ rather than simply 
restore a flawed status quo ante.78    
                                                          
Human Rights Brief 1; and Bactrach Michael ‘The Protection and Rights of Victims under International 
Criminal Law’ (2000) 34(1) The International Lawyer 7. 
71 Nesiah Vasuki et al ‘Truth Commissions and Gender: Principles, Policies, and Procedures’ (July 2006) 
International Center for Transitional Justice p 7. 
72 See Bell and O’Rourke above note 35 at 28. 
73 For example, just over 300 instances of sexual violence were reported to the UN-sponsored El 
Salvador Commission (1993). This is widely held to be a mere fraction of the real figure with under-
reportage variously attributed to the social stigma attached to sexual violence, fears of ostracisation or 
retaliation, and the failure of the commission to proactively solicit information on the theme. See 
Hoover Amelia ‘Conflict and Gender: Data Overview’ Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group 
Yale University (November 2009) 2. Full text available at <www.preventgbvafrica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Conflict_and_Gender_Data_Overview.pdf> (last accessed 18 April 2016). 
74 Ní Aoláin further cautions that the processes that ‘construct’ truth, in particular the privileging of 
certain kinds of memory (associated with ‘public’ allocations of power and territory), may have ‘a 
consistent patriarchal under-current’. Ní Aoláin and Turner above note 36 at 273. 
75 Ross Fiona C Bearing Witness: Women and the Truth and Reconciliation Process in South Africa Pluto Press 
London 2003. See further Millar Hayli ‘Facilitating Women’s Voices in Truth Recovery: An Assessment 
of Women’s Participation and the Integration of a Gender Perspective in Truth Commissions’ in 
Durham Helen and Gurd Tracey (eds) Listening to the Silences: Women and War Martinus Nijhoff Boston 
Leiden 2005 p 171-222. 
76 See Bell and O’Rourke above note 35. 
77 Rubio Marin Ruth ‘The Gender of Reparations: Setting the Agenda’ in Rubio Marin Ruth (ed) What 
Happened to the Women: Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations Social Science Research 
Council New York 2006 p 31. 
78 Urban Walker Margaret ‘Transformative Reparations? A Critical Look at a Current Trend in Thinking 
about Gender-Just Reparations’ (2015) International Journal of Transitional Justice 1. Walker uses the 
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Unsurprisingly, in our interviews and discussions with female cause-lawyers across 
the relevant jurisdictions we found the same variety of experiences with regard to the 
areas in which people worked during the transition as during the conflict or ‘struggle’ 
phase. For example, some lawyers were engaged in struggles to ensure that gender 
related issues were included in the transitional justice mechanisms operating in their 
particular jurisdiction while others applied themselves to specific aspects of dealing 
with the past work such as prosecution of past human rights abuses or filing civil 
actions on behalf of victims – or a combination of the two. We were also interested in 
exploring the ways in which their cause-lawyering was done, the networks in which 
they worked and their relations with civil society. At a conceptual level, we also 
sought to examine the ways in which activism and gender related struggles were 
imagined as part of the broader process of constructing and reproducing both the 
transition itself and the previous years of struggle.    
In the same way as conflict and struggle provided some opportunities for female 
cause-lawyers, a strong theme permeating our interviews was the notion of transition 
as a ‘window of opportunity’.79  For example one lawyer and a founding member of 
the Women’s National Coalition in South Africa, told us:  
People always said to us, you know, the first five or ten years is a great window of 
opportunity in every way - all the other African countries told us because they'd been 
down our road before - and although we thought that South Africa was the exception, it 
absolutely wasn't.  So they were just saying ‘use that space because it all really closes 
down’ and of course it does close down.  Institutions slowed down, bureaucracies become 
embedded - that kind of idea that ‘we're going to change the state and it's going to be 
open and participative and efficient’ disappears very quickly.80 
As O’Rourke, Keck and Sikkind and others have argued,81 the potential for feminist 
lawyers and civil society organisations to seize such opportunities often requires a 
combination of using international human rights standards, transnational 
mobilisation with international partners, as well as strategic litigation and 
mobilisation in the domestic context. In addition, in some transitional jurisdictions 
(including Northern Ireland where we live and work), heightened awareness of past 
rights abuses has seen increased legal, political and civil society attention focused on 
creating a more human rights aware culture as a buttress against such atrocities 
                                                          
useful illustration of the Moroccan Reconciliation Commission which apportioned benefits among 
family members of deceased victims in ways that departed from Morocco’s gender-biased inheritance 
law, resisting the established gender hierarchy. 
79 Gready Paul The Era of Transitional Justice Routledge London 2011; Root Rebecca ‘Through the 
Window of Opportunity: the Transitional Justice Network in Peru’ (2009) 31(2) Human Rights Quarterly 
473. 
80 Personal interview with legal academic and human rights activist, Johannesburg, South Africa, 13 
August 2014. 
81 Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks In International 
Politics Cornell University Press New York 1998; O’Rourke above note 33. 
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happening again.82 Even in contexts where such favourable conditions existed, cause-
lawyers working on gender-related issues were sometimes struggling to make 
progress in practice. As one self-identified cause-lawyer prosecutor in Chile told us;  
Even though in 2005 we passed a major domestic violence legislation even now the 
criminal courts don’t want to hear these cases. They don’t often convict maybe because 
there’s this understanding, a basic understanding that women’s issues are not human 
rights issues, they are family issues. In the cases of sexual violence and torture in the 
dictatorship; it has also been extremely difficult. I have spent over a year arguing for the 
cases to be heard by members of the Appelate court, just like all the other cases of the 
former dictatorship … We are trying to get them to understand that the violence suffered 
by women was a violence that was different from that of men but that it was also a kind 
of torture.83 
In the case of Chile, this disconnect between the crimes of the past and receptiveness 
to gender based arguments in the transition speaks to the durability of a conservative 
and patriarchal political and legal culture.84 In a similar vein in Cambodia, despite the 
fact that rape, sexual exploitation, sexual slavery and ‘forced marriages’ were all 
features of the Khmer Rouge regime, the Extra-ordinary Chamber in the Courts of 
Cambodia has only managed (after persistent lobbying by activists) to add ‘forced 
marriages’ to the charge sheet in one case – Case 002.85 A number of the cause lawyers 
we spoke to argued that such past abuses underpinned the culture of impunity 
regarding sexual violence in contemporary Cambodia. As one international lawyer 
told us: 
A UN report came out in June 2013 on violence against women and it shows that 
incidents of rape in Cambodia is even higher than other countries in the region.  So it's 
really a big issue and domestic violence is occurring a lot ... Men can buy women 
whenever they want, they can marry them whenever they want and they can beat them 
                                                          
82 Roht-Arriaza Naomi and Mariezcurrena Javier (eds) Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: 
Beyond Truth Versus Justice Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2006; Harvey, Colin ‘Bringing 
Humanity Home: A Transformative Human Rights Culture in Northern Ireland’ in McAlinden Anne 
Marie and Dwyer Clare (eds) Criminal Justice in Transition Hart Oxford 2015 p 47-67. 
83 Personal interview with Chilean human rights lawyer, Santiago, Chile, 28 April 2014. 
84 Macias Teresa ‘“Tortured Women and Hungry Widows”: Patriarchal Neoliberalism and the Logic of 
Compensational Justice in Chile’ (2013) 28(2) Affilia 126. 
85 Killean Rachel ‘An Incomplete Narrative: Prosecuting Sexual Violence Crimes at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 331. See also 
Elander Maria (in this issue). In April 2014, the ECCC Co-Prosecutor made two announcements that 
the Prosecution were ‘requesting the investigation of sexual or gender-based violence’ as an element of 
the broader charges in two further cases (003 and 004). The Cambodian government is opposed to these 
cases going ahead, arguing that the prosecutions in cases 001 and 002 should suffice, and that further 
prosecutions will ‘lead the country into instability’. See further Brinkley Joel ‘Justice Squandered: 
Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal’ (2013) World Affairs Journal. Available at: 
www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/justice-squandered-cambodia%E2%80%99s-khmer-rouge-
tribunal. Accessed 10 May 2016. 
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whenever they want and rape them so there are very little consequences because they are 
above the women … the legal system doesn't work so when a woman is raped and she 
goes to the police and the police will try to settle the dispute by negotiating a price with 
the perpetrator. The police will get maybe 25% and then the rest goes to the family and 
everybody shuts up and it’s justice.  And for me, it's fine that they do this but they cannot 
drop the criminal prosecution, it's fine that he pays compensation and they agree on it 
but he has to be prosecuted as well.86  
In other contexts, where there has been a much more dramatic political and legal 
transformation, the obstacles and cultural silences on gender-related issues facing 
cause-lawyers can be all the more insidious. For example, in his first State of Nation 
address to Parliament, former President Nelson Mandela said ‘freedom cannot be 
achieved unless women have been emancipated from all forms of oppression.’87 Evidence of 
the importance of gender equality and women’s rights are replete in the new South 
African Bill of Rights which is rightly acknowledged as one of the most progressive in 
the world.88 Indeed for some commentators, gender became a ‘moral touchstone’ by 
which to judge the transition in South Africa.89 Notwithstanding the undoubtedly 
important political and legal advances that have been made, rape and sexual violence 
against women remains an endemic problem.90 Even within the cause-lawyer 
community, gendered silences remain – not least because of the veneration of cause-
lawyers themselves who for many are a symbol of all that was good about the South 
African struggle. For example, one cause-lawyer related the story of a fellow activist 
who had been abused by her husband (himself a cause-lawyer):  
she's probably one of the famous women and she came to me and she revealed the subject 
of domestic abuse.  And I said to her, okay, we're going to help you and we're going to 
take your case out.  And inside the movement there was such a powerful silence that she 
should not break, but even though we were willing to help her take the risk, she just didn't 
have the guts to do it because no one wanted her to speak about it.  And I mean I keep 
saying to the women that, you see, we will never deal with domestic violence in our 
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country unless that story of abuse is told in our country, and that's the story of the 
struggle that's not told.91   
For this interviewee, such cover-up within the ranks of ‘struggle lawyers’ reflected 
more broadly on the legal profession:  
It's not a profession that took care of people and, you know … nobody wanted to 
touch another lawyer and I found that like the legal hypocrisy really incredible … I 
kind of thought this is a terrible profession, there is no sense of solidarity, caring or 
solidarity.92  
As noted above, a key element to the advancement of gender based issues for cause-
lawyers in all of the jurisdictions studied has been the development of relationships 
with civil society organisations, NGOs and other activists both locally and 
internationally. For many such organisations networks of ‘organized women’ are the 
driving force for gender-related struggles in transitional societies.93  Such relations 
between lawyers and civil society organisations have been a rich source of analysis for 
a number of years in the cause-lawyering literature more generally. For some, there 
are risks that if lawyers assume too much prominence in such social movements, 
strategies may become overly legalistic and thus divert scarce resources from other 
potentially more transformative methods of political and social struggle.94 Other 
accounts suggest that a range of variables including the local legal and political 
context in which lawyers and social movements are operating, the capacity of the 
movement, the professional and personal imperatives of the lawyers themselves (as 
above, some of whom may have been ‘activists first’) and other factors may contribute 
to a more fluid and dynamic relationship wherein the capacity for lawyers and legal 
strategy to dominate is reduced.95 The latter variant of the relationship was, broadly 
speaking, the most common in our research on women cause lawyers.  As one 
prominent lawyer in South Africa responded in relation to the question of whether 
lawyers tended to dominate in the social movements in which she was involved:  
Not in the women's movement, no, because you were held to account.  I mean in fact they 
changed me in many ways … because I did go in as a bit of a lawyer; you do learn to be 
the person who says how it is, right, 'cause that's what we do as lawyers; we pronounce 
on certainty, even though we know it's uncertainty.  You know, and they were having 
                                                          
91 Interview with international human rights lawyer, Johannesburg, South Africa, 16 August 2014. 
92 As above.  
93 Waylen above note 18. 
94 Scheingold Stuart A The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy and Political Change University of 
Michigan Press Ann Arbor 2nd ed 2004; Jones Lynn C ‘The Haves Come Out Ahead: How Cause 
Lawyers Frame the Legal System for Movements’ in Sarat Austin and Scheingold Stuart A (eds) Cause 
Lawyers and Social Movements Stanford University Press Stanford 2006 p 182-196.  
95 McCann Michael (ed) Law and Social Movements Ashgate Aldershot 2006; Boutcher Steven ‘Mobilizing 
in the Shadow of the Law: Lesbian and Gay Rights in the Aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick’ (2011) 31 
Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 175. 
21 
 
none of that.  So it was a wonderful experience for me because I was really challenged 
and questioned … I had a valid voice but then so did other people … I mean I remember 
just learning, having to learn very quickly, that, you know, that was my place and that I 
had validity and I had things to say but, you know, I was not the oracle.96   
We have noted that ‘the moment’ of transition can, from a feminist perspective, be 
viewed as one of ‘retrenchment’.97 Ní Aoláin develops this argument by suggesting 
that, whilst transition can create new ‘opportunities, ideas and sites of intervention’ 
that newness can equally hide ‘deep pitfalls of structural and entrenched gender 
discrimination’.98 Certainly in some contexts, the political negotiations and 
compromises required to build broad fronts in civil society during a transition 
appeared to require ‘sacrificing’ gendered issues in order to sustain importance 
alliances. In South Africa for example, leaders in the women’s movement told us that 
they ‘really had to fight the men’ to prevent the customary law provisions in the 
constitution being used to undermine the rights of rural women because of the ANC’s 
desire to placate tribal leaders.99 Similarly, in Chile as one veteran lawyer and civil 
society leader told us:     
Violence against women was a product of the international agenda – in Latin America 
and more particularly here in Chile. On the other hand, our demands, the women’s 
movement demands, have been hijacked by the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church 
was hugely important during the dictatorship and one of the issues on the table at the 
beginning of the transition period was that of women’s rights. But this was an issue that 
was negotiated with the Catholic Church, and I can say this because I was one of the 
participants of that process. I was one of the few who insisted that the issue of abortion, 
for example, had to be tackled straight on, but the political leaders of the opposition would 
tell us: “Those issues cannot be touched”.  It was only two years ago that we had divorce 
in Chile!100 
Finally, as is evidenced across the jurisdictions we have been researching, there is a 
complex relationship between material and symbolic advances for women and the 
ways in which these societies imagine their own transition and in some instances the 
cause-lawyers who have been seeking to advance such struggles. Inevitably, such 
                                                          
96 Personal interview with legal academic and human rights activist, Johannesburg, South Africa, 13 
August 2014. 
97 See Ní Aoláin and Turner above note 36 at 273. In the case of South Africa, Albertyn similarly cautions 
that constitutionalism and rights can introduce a dangerous sense of apathy: ‘One of the tasks for 
women in South Africa is to ensure that the interim Constitution, with its rights framework, is not used 
in a way which restricts rather than furthers the goal of gender equality … all of this needs to take place 
within a vision of social reconstruction that addresses the material bases of women’s inequality’. 
Albertyn Catherine above note 31 at pp 62-63. 
98 Ní Aoláin above note 31 at 3. 
99 Personal interview with legal academic and human rights activist, Johannesburg, 13 August 2014. 
100 Personal interview with Chilean human rights lawyer, Santiago, Chile, 30 April 2014. 
22 
 
processes are shaped by the previous era of conflict or authoritarianism. The temporal 
nature of ‘transitional’ justice arguably creat 
 
es false dichotomies between the exotic and terrible violence of the past and the 
assumed improvements of any new dispensation.101 For example, as one interviewee 
told us in Tunis, ‘amongst the biggest lies of the former regime is that Tunisia was the land 
of women’s freedom and equal rights.’102 Similarly, in Israel, a state which is still very 
much in conflict and which is certainly demonstrating increased authoritarian 
tendencies, several cause-lawyers and activists critiqued the efforts of the Israeli 
government to ‘pinkwash’ the occupation and associated abuses of Palestinians by 
constantly referring international audiences to the country’s comparatively 
‘progressive legislation and policies on gender and LGBT rights.’103  
These contests regarding the ways in which both past and present are constructed and 
reproduced are also part of the struggle of cause-lawyers. It is all too easy for neat 
narratives to dominate and for what Mazzei describes as ‘the voices in the cracks’ to 
be silenced.104 In South Africa for example, the veneration of struggle lawyers can 
produce narratives where both women and black lawyers are ‘written out’ of the ways 
in which the struggle and transition are remembered. Cause lawyers are not just 
litigators but rather, as Sarat and Scheingold have argued, they are involved in a 
‘mutually constitutive relationship’ with the social, political and legal worlds in which 
they operate and which they help to create.105  
 
4.0  Conclusion 
 
Women's rights are seen as human rights, and that's again largely because there have 
been so many women who have been working in this field who've done a good job of 
pushing and making sure that it's not an issue that we wait to address when the 
occupation is over, but that you continually address it while the occupation is ongoing.106   
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Just over a decade ago Posner and Vermeule offered a strong critique of the 
‘exceptionalist’ strain in transitional justice. They argued that much transitional justice 
scholarship had ‘gone wrong’ by failing to grasp the connections between ordinary 
justice and ordinary politics in consolidated democracies and the challenges faced in 
transitional contexts.107 In the context of female cause lawyers, that critique provokes 
at least two interrelated questions: what if anything is unique or different about the 
contexts of conflict and transition in terms of shaping the experience of women 
lawyers? When the ‘dust settles’ what substantive difference has the contribution of 
female cause lawyers made (directly or indirectly) to gender equality issues?  
 
We have argued above that what is different about the experience of women lawyers 
in contexts of conflict and transition is evident in terms of opportunities, the 
politicisation of lawyering, the intersection of conflict and gender, and the very real 
personal consequences for engagement in such work. As will be clear from our use of 
the cause-lawyering and sociology of lawyers’ literature, we share the view that those 
of us who work in transitional justice should remain open to theoretical and practical 
insights from non-transitional settings. We nonetheless contend that the particular 
scale, intensity and human consequences of the issues faced by cause-lawyers in 
authoritarian and conflicted contexts such as Cambodia, Chile, Tunisia, South Africa, 
Israel and Palestine are an obvious and compelling reason for a discrete focus on 
transitional justice. Moreover, as we know only too well from our own work in 
Northern Ireland, in contexts where transitions are so often marked by the scars of our 
particular past, being able to draw on the themes and experiences from other 
transitional contexts offers a useful bulwark against parochialism and what Ignatieff 
(borrowing from Freud) has termed the ‘narcissism of minor differences’108 – factors 
which inevitably mitigate against successful conflict transformation. Indeed in this 
research we have sought to avoid what Ní Aoláin has termed the dangers of reifying 
the ‘gender agenda’.109 We have thus acknowledged the very different historical, 
cultural, religious and political structures and contexts within which the cause-
lawyers we interviewed live and work and sought to capture some of the range and 
complexity of that agency.  
 
With regard to the issue of ‘making a difference’ to gender equality issues we have 
noted that the ‘opportunities’ arising for individual female lawyers during both 
conflict and transition do not automatically translate into wider material gains for 
women in the legal profession – or indeed wider society. Certainly in the contexts in 
which we have been researching, themes such as glass ceilings in the legal profession, 
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silos of legal practice, patriarchal legal and political cultures, and the strains on 
personal and familial relations are familiar to women lawyers anywhere. This 
inevitably raises the spectre of patriarchal state-building in the guise of transitional 
justice.110 The related argument that feminists may have channelled precious energy 
and resources into resolutely patriarchal legal and political transitional processes was 
most forcefully made in South Africa. Here, as we have noted, the fact that more than 
twenty years out from the ending of apartheid deep gender inequalities persist 
inevitably gave rise to disillusionment. Reflecting on what she considered to be 
‘missed opportunities’ for women in South Africa, a former ANC activist stated: 
 
I think that golden age has gone … I think we lost a lot of opportunities, we lost a lot of 
ground and we lost a lot of women … Some of them have become diplomats, others went 
into the party hierarchy, into government … you get into the structure and well the 
structure swallows you.  And then that voice is no more, you know, it's not possible to 
put a foot out again and enter the other platform. So now we don't have those public 
spaces … organisations we knew during the apartheid era no longer exist. Local 
structures are not there anymore and if you're out to mobilise people you need a vehicle 
to do it, you need a mechanism, and we don't have those mediating mechanisms 
anymore.  So yeah, I think we've lost the momentum on that really.111 
The suggestion that the ‘structure’ swallows you up resonates with the arguments 
developed by Gready and colleagues in relation to the inability of transitional justice 
to withstand the impact of neo-liberal economics.112 It also lends weight to the 
argument made by Ní Aoláin and others that apparent ‘gains’ for women can 
sometimes be viewed in hindsight as ‘a wily form of gendered window dressing’.113 
In the case of our field research, this caused us to question whether female cause 
lawyers have somehow been complicit in propping up and perpetuating deeply 
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gendered processes, accommodations and structures.114 A number of the women we 
interviewed certainly adopted a pragmatic ‘work the system’ approach and 
essentially ‘matched’ the contribution of their male counterparts.115 Resonating with   
Scheingold’s famous ‘myth of rights’ critique,116 we were also conscious that what 
Bourdieu referred to as the ‘force of law’ and the social prominence of some ‘celebrity’ 
female cause lawyers could arguably displace resources or attention from other 
‘grassroots’ gender struggles.117  
 
Mindful of all of these structural challenges, we have nonetheless been buoyed by the 
experience of interviewing women cause-lawyers for this study. As noted, research 
on conflict and transition is sometimes inclined to cast men as active agents and 
women as largely passive victims.118 This study provides a useful corrective to such 
tendencies. The women that we interviewed had fought hard to assert their agency, 
whatever the difficult circumstances of their work. As Kirchheimer has argued, in 
highly politicised contexts, law and legal settings provide a space for contests over 
political power and, by invoking claims to justice, lawyers inevitably challenge those 
in power to justify and rationalise existing power relations.119 The women we spoke 
to were and in many cases remain at the very heart of the social and political struggles 
of their respective societies.  O’Rourke has previously argued that, compared to 
previous eras, women have secured unprecedented ‘influence clout and leverage’ and 
thrown down a challenge to feminists to take responsibility and ‘ownership of the 
consequences of our advocacy and participation in transitional justice processes.’120 
Many of the cause lawyers we interviewed have done exactly that.  
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